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CROSSING THE FENCE: CHALLENGES 
OF OPERATIONALIZING PSSM 
by Elvan Isikozlu, Matthias Krötz, and Claire Trancart [ BICC ]
Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) can be broadly defined as a series of activities that make nation-al stockpiles of weapons and ammunition safe and secure. 
Over the last decade, PSSM has become a highly requested form of 
intervention to curb the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons 
(SA/LW) and conventional ammunition (CA), as well as to keep 
communities safe from unintended explosions. Donors have pro-
vided substantial funding for PSSM activities to countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, where we have learned that the impact of PSSM 
assistance depends a great deal on how actively improvements are 
maintained.1  
Maintaining PSSM improvements has to do with influencing hu-
man behavior. Organizations supporting national institutions with 
PSSM are well aware of this but are often overwhelmed by immedi-
ate, tangible needs on the ground such as demands for new depots, 
fencing, or training. While these activities are critical, they will eas-
ily go to waste if PSSM is not practiced on a daily basis. This arti-
cle will discuss three challenges that we have observed and present 
some critical questions for organizations to consider when provid-
ing PSSM assistance.
Challenge #1: Leadership of PSSM
Traditionally, PSSM falls within the purview of defense and 
security institutions. However, since the Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) was adopted in 2001, as well 
as the entry into force of, among others, the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (2006), States Parties are mandated to establish na-
tional SA/LW commissions to advise their governments, security, 
and defense forces in developing a small arms policy.2,3 PSSM is 
part of this policy and is therefore in the purview of national SA/
LW commissions. However, these commissions are often not rec-
ognized or treated as the legitimate leaders of PSSM, nor are they 
given adequate authority by the top echelons of government. This 
lack of clarity challenges the ability of implementing organizations 
to roll out their assistance, as they may have to coordinate with 
more than one national body in order to access storage facilities, 
interview personnel, and/or assist in setting priorities. 
Apart from which entity is the physical leader of the PSSM port-
folio, there is also the question of whether this entity provides 
conceptual leadership of PSSM. This has also been referred to as 
national ownership of the PSSM portfolio. In some cases, strong 
national leadership is overlooked by donors due to conflicting in-
terests. However, when national leadership of this kind is missing, 
it is often provided by outside organizations or donors who may 
implement their own priorities for PSSM. There are a number of 
reasons why national and local leadership of PSSM may be missing. 
For example, these leaders may prioritize other security-related 
issues over PSSM, and some may even benefit from the status quo. 
There are also practical reasons why national and local leadership 
of PSSM may be missing—namely a lack of motivation and capac-
ity to practice PSSM—to which we turn to next. 
Challenge #2: Motivation to Practice PSSM
Requesting assistance for PSSM does not necessarily mean that 
motivation to practice PSSM exists. Even if motivation for PSSM is 
high at the top level of government, it does not automatically trick-
le down. Motivation needs to exist at lower levels of government 
by those doing the job. It is not enough to train security service 
personnel and armorers on what they should do for PSSM, they 
should also be taught why. In most cases, this means understand-
ing some of their grievances and findings ways to relay them to na-
tional leaders of PSSM. For example, some individuals working in 
armories expressed frustration over the lack of career opportuni-
ties for PSSM personnel, especially given the potential health haz-
ards and physical danger of working around decaying weapons.4 
It is also important to consider whether there are motivations 
to not practice PSSM. Some individuals may benefit financially 
from having unregulated access to SA/LW by renting them out, 
selling them on the black market, supporting poaching activities, 
or committing robberies.5 Addressing motivations against PSSM 
is a significant challenge for implementers and, more importantly, 
for national governments. They can be mitigated through greater 
job recognition, career advancement opportunities, access to reg-
ular training, and salary increases. These qualitative and quan-
titative benefits can also serve as incentives to recruit and retain 
PSSM personnel. 
SA/LW records, smoke grenades, and coffee mugs are in a local armory. 
The image demonstrates the lack of standard operating procedures.
All photos courtesy of Nikhil Acharya, BICC.
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Challenge #3: Capacity to Practice PSSM
The lack of institutional capacity to practice PSSM—and the con-
sequent outsourcing of capacity to perform certain tasks—is an-
other challenge to maintaining PSSM improvements over the long 
term. Conflict-affected countries particularly struggle to take on 
the many responsibilities of PSSM. Tasks such as drafting standard 
operating procedures (SOP), organizing trainings, and coordinat-
ing armory inspections need to be assigned to a particular institu-
tion with the ability to absorb these tasks as part of their ongoing 
operations. In the absence of these institutions or skilled person-
nel, external or seconded staff is often invited to take over some 
of these tasks. The benefit of outsourcing is clear: improvements to 
PSSM are made in a relatively short period of time. The disadvan-
tage is that little of the expertise and skills necessary to operation-
alize PSSM are left behind. 
Dealing with this challenge means considering how any type of 
PSSM improvement will be operationalized before the work begins. 
It means assessing what kind of managerial capacities exist within 
responsible institutions and building these capacities in lieu of or in 
addition to material assistance. For example, PSSM requires skills 
in project management, budgeting, human resource management, 
etc., none of which are specific to PSSM per se but are critical to its 
practice over the long term. It also means adjusting the expecta-
tions of donors and implementers to match the realities of the local 
context and not the other way around. Many institutional capaci-
ties required to meet regional and international PSSM guidelines 
are limited. Rather than overburden these governments, it may be 
more realistic and effective to search for localized, low-cost options 
for stockpile safety and security that can be maintained and im-
proved upon in the future.
Looking Ahead
To date, PSSM assistance has understandably focused on ur-
gent needs and threats by providing material assistance, technical 
A Congolese armorer locks up his armory. The note on the door and the 
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guidance, and equipment to sub-Saharan countries in particular. 
Our concern is that these needs and threats will reappear if assis-
tance does not address the less tangible, more human-oriented and 
longer-term needs for PSSM. The impact of PSSM comes from how 
actively any and all improvements are maintained. This means that 
PSSM needs to be practiced on a daily basis and integrated into the 
ongoing operations of designated institutions. It is time to reflect 
on the extent to which donors and implementing organizations are 
supporting these needs and hence the operationalization of PSSM. 
PSSM does not occur in a vacuum. The challenges that we have 
outlined in this article are also shared with the wider SA/LW and 
CA management agenda. It is difficult for any donor or external 
implementing agency to influence lasting change on this issue if a 
country does not have a national weapons control framework in 
which to legitimize and prioritize activities. There is only so much 
work that can be supported and sustained from the bottom up in 
the absence of top down directives and leadership. The best way 
forward for donors and implementing organizations is to support 
a combination of both, and to continue to reflect on the impact of 
their contributions. 
See endnotes page 66
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Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic 
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military compo-
nents’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines 
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase 
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments 
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or 
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs 
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and 
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items 
or components explosive in nature. 
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure 
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes 
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty. 
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ ele-
ments of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley, 
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C. 
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017. 
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy. 
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great 
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM. 
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn: 
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working 
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory 
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together 
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese, 
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. 
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while ca-
sualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100 
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European 
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015): 
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11.  Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, 2017.
References
1. “Unplanned Explosions at Munition Sites.” Small Arms Survey. 13 September 2016. http://bit.ly/1konVpr. Accessed 5 October 2017.
Strengthening Security in Mali With Weapons and Ammunition Management by Dupouy [ from page 23 ]
1. “Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in Mali, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2364 (2017).” United Nations. 29 June 2017. http://bit.ly/2xiGxEl. Accessed 
5 October 2017.
2. S/RES/2370 (2017) adopted on 2nd August 2017, on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts - Preventing terrorists from acquiring weap-
ons.”
Clearing Landmines and Building Peace in Colombia by Finson and Diffidenti [ from page 25 ]
1. “Colombia: Casualties and Victim Assistance.” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. Last modified 9 November 2016. http://bit.ly/2xOgnpn. 
Humanitarian Mine Action and IEDs by McInally and Risser [ from page 30 ]
1. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction Article 2: Paragraphs 1 and 2.” 
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 1997. Accessed 6 October 2017. http://bit.ly/2kHbzf0.
2. “The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices Article 2: Paragraphs 1 and 3.” Protocol II, Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, 1996 United Nations. Accessed 6 October 2017. http://bit.ly/2fRGa8G. 
3. “Guide for the application of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).” Accessed 6 October 2017. http://bit.ly/2wC0xxa.
Endnotes
3
Isikozlu et al.: Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
